



Is the Window of
Opportunity Closing for
Brazilian Youth?




Brazilian youth today face enormous difficulties in penetrating the labor
market, a situation much different from the one 25 years ago. While
females have entered the labor market and increased their employment
rate many are unemployed. Youth unemployment reached 19.1 percent
in 2002; up from 4.5 percent in 1978. This paper analyzes long-run trends,
as well as the impact of business cycles, on Brazilian youth in the labor
market. To do this, the paper uses Brazilian household data (PNAD)
spanning 1978–2002 and covering 290,000–530,000 individuals per year.
Two main findings are presented: First, the labor market situation for youth
has deteriorated and did especially so in the 1990s. In particular, labor
force participation and employment have been decreasing relatively more
for youth than for adults, but also wages decreased and unemployment
increased for youth. Second, Brazilian youth were adversely impacted by
business cycle fluctuations. During recessions youth lost ground compared
to adults in the labor market in terms of labor force participation,
employment, and to some extent unemployment. During expansions youth
did not catch up on adults; in fact, the gap continued to widen.
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Brazilian youth today face enormous difficulties in 
penetrating the labor market, a situation much different from the 
one 25 years ago. While females have entered the labor market and 
increased their employment rate many are unemployed. Youth 
unemployment reached 19.1 percent in 2002; up from 4.5 percent 
in 1978. This paper analyzes long-run trends, as well as the impact 
of business cycles, on Brazilian youth in the labor market. To do 
this, the paper uses Brazilian household data (PNAD) spanning 
1978−2002 and covering 290,000−530,000 individuals per year. 
Two main findings are presented: First, the labor market situation 
for youth has deteriorated and did especially so in the 1990s. In 
particular, labor force participation and employment have been 
decreasing relatively more for youth than for adults, but also wages 
decreased and unemployment increased for youth. Second, 
Brazilian youth were adversely impacted by business cycle 
fluctuations. During recessions youth lost ground compared to 
adults in the labor market in terms of labor force participation, 
employment, and to some extent unemployment. During 
expansions youth did not catch up on adults; in fact, the gap 
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Introduction 
 
The Brazilian labor market experienced severe business cycle fluctuations over 
the 25 years covered here (1978−2002), and over the same time period the situation for 
Brazilian youth (age 15−24) deteriorated. Trade liberalization, political turmoil, 
hyperinflation, and exchange rate fluctuations had serious repercussions on the labor 
market. In 2002, the Brazilian labor force consisted of about 81 million workers (age 
15−64); around two thirds of a population of 179 million people. The total 
unemployment rate was around 10 percent, meaning that some 8 million were 
unemployed.
2 For youth in the labor market the situation worsened; employment 
dropped, unemployment increased, and wages fell.   
 
  Youth have become more and more important for the Brazilian labor market in 
recent decades because of their increase in size; in 2004 more than 19 percent of all 
Brazilians were between 15 and 24 years old, i.e., over 35 million people. The size of the 
Brazilian youth cohorts is currently peaking.
3 In the 1950s, crude birth rates were already 
falling in Brazil, but death rates fell faster, creating annual population growth rate of 3 
percent between 1960 and 1965 (Lam 2006).
4 As the cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s 
reached childbearing age, births peaked around 1982. This large cohort is about to enter 
the labor market, and its size may put pressure on wages, employment, and growth. At 
the same time, the youth bulge is also a window of opportunity resulting from a 
potentially favorable ratio of working age population to the dependent population once 
the surge has stopped and youth move into adulthood. For example, the rise in the 
proportion of working population to non-working population in East Asia after the youth 
bulge played an important role in the economic miracle in the region (ibid.). However, 
Brazilian youth have not had sufficient access to education, health services, and other 
measures that facilitate an easy transition into the labor market. In fact, the Brazilian 
labor market situation is worse for youth than the general overview suggests. With an 
unemployment rate of 19.1 percent in 2002, Brazilian youth were at a disadvantage in 
entering the labor market, and thereby to develop their skills and gain experience. 
 
This paper analyzes long-run trends in the Brazilian labor market as well as the 
impact of business cycles on youth compared to adults (25−49 years). Thus, by use of 
Brazilian household data (PNAD) spanning 1978−2002 and covering 290,000−530,000 
individuals per year the paper provides new research on Brazilian youth in the labor 
market in at least two ways: i) It provides a detailed overview of the main labor market 
indicators’ trends and evolution over a quarter of a century, and ii) it analyzes the effects 
of business cycle fluctuations on youth compared to adults in the labor market. It differs 
from previous studies by analyzing four labor market indicators over a long time span 
and within business cycles with direct focus on youth. The four indicators are: Labor 
force participation, employment, unemployment, and hourly real wages.    
                                                 
2 Own calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI) and Brazilian household data (PNAD). 
3 The actual peak is estimated at year 2024, but because of a projected negative average growth rate, Lam 
(2006) categorizes Brazilian youth (12─24 years) as effectively peaking in size between 2000 and 2010. 
4 The crude birth rate is the number of births per year divided by the total mid-year population, expressed 
as a ratio of births per 1000 population. The crude death rate is deaths per year per 1000 population.    4
The main findings of the paper show that the labor market situation for Brazilian 
youth has deteriorated, and that business cycles have adversely affected youth. First, the 
labor market situation for youth is found to have deteriorated significantly between 1978 
and 2002 both in levels and compared to adults. In the 1980s, the labor market situation 
slowly worsened, but in the 1990s the labor market deteriorated in terms of most labor 
market indicators, especially for youth. While females are not at par with males in the 
labor market, they have generally been catching up over the years. However, especially 
young females have experienced an increasing unemployment rate, because the labor 
market did not fully absorb the increased participation or had the sufficient wage 
flexibility. Second, while the long-run trends appear to have played the key role for 
youth, youth are also found to be adversely affected by business cycle fluctuations. While 
youth tend to suffer more in recessions, they do not catch up on adults during expansions.  
 
The paper consists of five sections. Section 1 describes major changes in the 
Brazilian economy during the 25 years covered, as well as a brief literature review. 
Section 2 describes the data, and identifies the main labor market indicators. Using these 
indicators, Section 3 analyzes long-run trends in the labor market. In contrast, Section 4 
identifies five business cycles, and analyzes the differences in impact between youth and 
adults within these periods. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. The Brazilian Labor Market  
 
The Brazilian labor market displays macroeconomic flexibility and 
microeconomic rigidity. The Brazilian labor market is generally characterized by 
macroeconomic flexibility, because of pragmatic labor unions, its–until recently–
relatively low unemployment rate, and high job turnover both during recessions and 
expansions. However, the labor market also displays rigidity, because of segmentation, 
inequity, informality, inequality of earnings, high frequency of litigation, limited worker 
protection, and limited reach of labor laws (Carneiro 2003).  
 
1.1 Economic Fluctuations and Continued Urbanization 1978−2002 
  
Brazil experienced a positive, but low average growth rate over the 25 years 
covered (Figure 1.1), however, wide economic fluctuations occurred. GDP per capita 
increased 18.6 percent from 1978 to 2002, i.e., 0.7 percent annual growth. Yet, the low 
average growth rate for the period hides a number of recessions and expansions. Growth 
rates fluctuated significantly and were as high as 6.7 and 5.8 percent annual growth in 
1980 and 1986, respectively, and as low as -6.6 and -5.9 percent in 1981 and 1990, 
respectively (Figure 1.2). Five business cycles are analyzed in this paper and are 
identified and described in Appendix A. The shading in all figures marks these cycles; a 
dark shaded area identifies recessions, and a light shaded area identifies expansions.  
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Figure 1.1: Brazil GDP per capita, 1978−2005 
(constant 2000 US$) 


























































 Source: WDI 
 
The economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s had negative effects on 
employment. The reforms aimed at liberalization of international trade and financial 
flows, fiscal discipline, price stabilization, and privatization.
5 These reforms, combined 
with currency appreciation and restructuring in the manufacturing sector, generally had 
negative implications for employment (Marshall 2004).  
 
The relatively low labor protection in Brazil makes the labor market responsive to 
economic fluctuations. Generally, it is easy to dismiss workers in Brazil since labor 
protection is relatively low. On the one hand, strong labor protection may inhibit 
employment growth and increase unemployment. This may be the case, because 
protection stimulates substitution by deterring employers from recruiting during 
economic expansions and encourage temporary contracts, overtime, and precarious 
employment relations. On the other hand, constraints on dismissals help restrain 
unemployment growth during recessions and stabilize labor demand in the longer term 
(ibid.). In this way the relatively low labor protection in Brazil is a sign of labor market 
flexibility, but also an indicator of the existence of vulnerable groups, who are harder 
affected by economic shocks.  
 
The economic and demographic evolution also changed the prevailing character 
of local areas. Table 1.1 shows how urbanization accelerated toward 2002 when just 15 
percent of the working age population resided in rural areas. Youth tend to live to a larger 
extent than adult workers in rural areas. This is partly explained by the fact that rural 
families are larger. Also, a larger proportion of females than males live in urban areas. 
The change to more than 85 percent of the working age population living in urban areas 




                                                 
5 In less than five years after 1990 non-tariff barriers were removed, and the average import tariff fell from 
32 percent to less than 13 percent (World Bank 2002a).    6
Table 1.1: Urbanization by Age and Gender, Brazil (1978−2002) 
      1978 1989 2002 
All  70.1 76.7 85.3 
Female  71.6 78.1 86.6  Total (15─65 years) 
Male  68.5 75.2 84.0 
All  69.2 75.3 84.4 
Female  70.7 76.9 85.6  Youth (15─24 years) 
Male  67.5 73.7 83.1 
All  71.0 77.7 86.3 
Female  72.1 78.8 87.4  Adults (25─49 years) 
Male  69.8 76.5 85.0 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
  
1.2 Literature Review 
 
  The Brazilian labor market as a whole has been widely studied, but long-run 
trends for youth as a group and their response to business cycles less so.  
 
In a series of studies by World Bank (2007a, 2007b) youth at risk in Brazil are 
analyzed extensively, considering also labor market aspects. A cross section analysis of 
PNAD (see description in Section 2.1) for 2001 shows the Brazilian youth have serious 
difficulties in completing a successful transition into the labor market. Unemployment 
rates are much higher and employment rates lower for youth than for adults. Employment 
is found to be sensitive to gender; not race. Females face higher unemployment rates and 
lower employment rates in spite of their higher educational attainment. This is mainly 
explained by unpaid domestic work, discrimination, and social expectations.  
 
  In a jobs report on Brazil, the World Bank (2002a, 2002b) describes the general 
labor market over a long time period as a mixed picture. Employment increased slightly 
between 1974 and 1999, mainly driven by rural females. However, from the mid 1990s 
onward key indicators such as employment growth, labor force participation rate, 
unemployment rate, and income security worsened. Employment, unemployment, and 
wages responded well to macroeconomic fluctuations, but it is argued the results hide 
microeconomic rigidities. 
 
Neri and Thomas (2000a) examine the impact of business cycles in Brazil, and 
find that less educated workers are adversely affected, and that recessions push youth into 
the labor market. They examine three recessions, and contrast these with three expansions 
over the period 1982−1999 using Brazil’s monthly employment survey, PME (Pesquisa 
Mensal de Emprego). Findings show that mobility between employment states and 
income levels is higher among educated workers. The authors conclude that negative 
shocks carry more weight for youth and less educated, on average poorer workers, since 
the subsequent chances of recovery are slimmer. In addition, youth are more likely to 
start work or repeat a school year during recessions. Finally, the official unemployment 
rate is found to be insufficient as a labor market indicator because it only captures the 
formal labor market.  
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Building on these findings, Neri and Thomas (2000b) examine the impact of 
seven business cycles in Brazil in relation to movement in and out of unemployment and 
poverty using the same data. They find that during economic expansions unemployment 
is the state least likely to lead to poverty, and most likely to lead out of it. In contrast, 
during recessions unemployment is the state most likely to lead to poverty, but also most 
likely to lead out of it. This is explained by poor workers not being able to afford 
unemployment, but during economic expansions some workers use unemployment and 
unemployment insurance to search for better jobs.  
  
Justesen and Verner (2007) analyze the effects of business cycles on youth in 
neighboring Argentina. Wage returns to different levels of education for different age 
groups and the likelihood of unemployment over the business cycle are analyzed using 
the EPH (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares) covering 1992−2003. Results suggest that 
Argentine youth in the period examined were affected more severely than adults by 
macroeconomic shocks through wider fluctuations in their unemployment rate and real 
wage returns. In response to economic fluctuations, and especially during economic 
downturns, youth were more negatively affected than adults in regard to real wage 
returns. Furthermore, more education meant higher wage returns, and tertiary education 
to some extent shielded against economic fluctuations. Also, education reduced the 
likelihood of unemployment. A key finding is that the lack of experience and 
connections, which is strongly associated with age, made youth more vulnerable with 
respect to business cycle fluctuations.  
 
Zylberstajn and de Souza (1994) find that low skilled are the first to lose their 
jobs during recessions. They argue that labor hoarding by firms during recessions is 
common in Brazil, and this protects high skilled workers more than low skilled. Thus, 
unskilled or less experienced workers—such as youth—are the first to lose their jobs 
during recessions. At the same time, shortage of tertiary educated workers in Brazil 
combined with a shift in labor demand, led to an increase in the skill premium for tertiary 
educated over the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank 2004).  
 
  Duryea et al. (2001) find that negative income shocks pull Brazilian youth out of 
school, and push them into the labor market. In an analysis of the effects of economic 
shocks to household income on youth employment, the authors use the PME data over 
the period 1982−1998. Findings show high volatility in employment, with higher exit and 
lower entry rates being responsible for the decline in youth employment in the 1990s. 
Results from a probit model of the effect of the household head becoming unemployed 
(capturing loss of household income) suggest a pull effect making youth leave school, 
and a push effect moving them into the labor market. However, the impact is found to be 
small.  
 
In conclusion, previous studies have dealt with a number of issues related to the 
topics covered in this paper. Youth in the labor market have been compared to adults by 
use of cross section data and findings suggest that youth are struggling. Long-term trends 
have shown a general deterioration for the Brazilian labor market as a whole and for 
youth in particular. Business cycles and negative income shocks tend to have adverse   8
impacts on youth and the less skilled. In fact, youth are more affected by business cycles 
fluctuations than adults through wider fluctuations in the unemployment rate and wages.  
 
The current paper distinguishes itself from previous studies in a number of ways. 
Building on previous findings, the paper analyzes long-run trends and effects of business 
cycle fluctuations on the Brazilian labor market with particular interest in how youth 
fared over a period of 25 years. It differs from previous studies by analyzing a broad set 
of labor market indicators over a long time span with direct focus on youth. Rather than 
relying simply on the unemployment or wage rate, four labor market indicators are 
examined in detail for youth over a quarter of a century: Labor force participation, 
employment, unemployment, and hourly real wages. The analysis is taken one step 
further by evaluating the relative changes between youth and adults within five business 
cycles using the same indicators to find a pattern in the response to expansions and 
recessions. Besides considering the different age groups, the paper also considers gender, 
location, and skill level.  
 
This study focuses on the Brazilian labor market and does not seek to provide an 
international comparison with countries in the region. For studies on Latin American 
youth in the labor market see, e.g., World Bank (forthcoming), ILO (2007), Gasparini et 
al. (2006), Cacciamali (2005), and Fawcett (2003), on interventions, Puerto 
(forthcoming), Llisterri et al. (2006), and Jamillo (2006), for a global perspective, World 
Bank (2007c) and O’Higgins (2003), and for developed countries, Ryan (2006).  
 
 
2. Data and Labor Market Indicators 
  
  This section describes the data set used throughout the paper, and defines the 




  The data used are Brazilian household data spanning 1978−2002. The data were 
obtained from the Micro Data Development Platform at the World Bank and are named 
PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios). The data are produced by IBGE 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The PNAD is a nationally representative 
stratified random sample of the Brazilian population, collected annually since the late 
1970s. The data contain a comprehensive and comparable set of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables including detailed information on employment status, 
occupation, income, and education for all household members. The PNAD has a great 
advantage compared to formal labor market data, because it contains both formal and 
informal workers, and it is thereby more representative of the labor market. Formal and 
informal jobs are not discussed separately here, but workers from both sectors are 
included. The sample size is 290,000−530,000 individuals per year. There are no data for 
the census years 1980, 1991, and 2000, and the PNAD was neither carried out in 1994 for 
cost related reasons. Results for these missing years are therefore extrapolated using the 
year before and after. After each census year, the PNAD questionnaire has important   9
changes, and in 1992 even the definition of employment was changed. The data used here 
seek to account for these changes, but issues of concern will be discussed when relevant.    
 
2.2 Labor Market Indicators  
 
  To analyze the situation for youth in the labor market a single measure does not 
provide an accurate picture. Therefore, multiple indicators are used to analyze the labor 
market situation for youth. These indicators are defined below.   
 
Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) 
 
The LFPR is a measure of the extent to which an economy’s working-age 
population is economically active. It is defined as the proportion of the population group 
(for example youth) in focus (P) that is in the labor force (L). The labor force consists of 









Employment Rate (ER) vs. Corrected Employment Rate (ER
C) 
 




ER =  
The ER indicates the proportion of employed workers out of those available for 
employment. Since this paper is specifically interested in a comparison between youth 
and adult workers, the definition of the standard employment rate could to a certain 
extent be misleading. Because a large proportion of youth attend school, the entire youth 
population is not available for the labor market. In contrast, only a small proportion of 
adult workers attend school, and practically the entire age group is available for 
employment. Thus, by excluding school attendees (S) a corrected employment rate is 








The employment rates have potentially a measurement advantage compared to the 
unemployment rate, because the base used is a relatively constant population group. In 
contrast, the labor force used as base for the unemployment rate reflects both supply and 
demand factors, because a response to a weak labor market may be retraction from the 
group. Opposite, a strong labor market may attract people, who would normally not seek 
employment, to join the labor force. This movement in and out of the labor force makes 
the interpretation of the unemployment rate less clear, because the shifts may understate 
the employment conditions, both when they are good and bad. The employment rates 
may better reflect variation in demand, because the population is more constant over time 
(Fares et al. 2006).    
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Unemployment Rate (UR) 
 
The UR is an indicator of the difficulty of finding work, as well as the willingness 
to accept an offer. The UR is defined as the proportion of the labor force that is without a 
job and actively seeking one. 
L
U
UR =  
 
Hourly Real Wages (HRW) 
 
The wages examined are estimated hourly real wages in Brazilian reales at 2002 
prices.
6 The HRW has been calculated using monthly real income from the main job, and 
weekly hours worked in the main job. Since the return to labor and not capital is of 
interest, self-employed and employers are excluded, and wage and salaried workers 
(henceforth referred to as wage workers) are singled out for the analysis.
7 Thus, only 
employed wage workers reporting both monthly income and hours worked are included. 
Because of outliers dramatically affecting average income (specifically in 1979), the first 
and last percentiles have been discarded. Also, employed wage workers reporting 70 or 
more hours worked in the reference week are excluded. Wage income obviously does not 
show total income or consumption, but still indicates the impact of the business cycle on 
an individual in the labor market. More than 96.8 percent of wage workers between 15 
and 65 years of age report both income from and hours worked in their main job. For 
employed youth and adults, 97.6 and 96.5 percent, respectively, have observed hourly 




Besides age, gender, and location, the labor market indicators are also analyzed 
by skill level. Workers have different skills and therefore different productivity in the 
labor market. High skilled workers are more productive than low skilled workers, but 
generally high skilled workers also receive higher wages reflecting their productivity. 
Thus, workers with different skill levels may be affected differently in the long run and 
by business cycles, because production shifts and wages adjust. Skills are measured by 
years of schooling completed. Throughout the period covered, the Brazilin education 
system has been almost status quo in terms of years in school per level completed and 
will be treated as such (Table 2.1). Two skill levels are defined: High skilled workers are 
those with 9 or more years of completed schooling, and low skilled workers are those 
with 8 or less years of completed schooling (including those who have never attended 
school). The category “high skilled” includes workers who have at least started upper 
secondary school, and means to capture workers who have obtained basic skills such as 
numeracy and literacy, but also more advanced skills applicable to the labor market. This 
                                                 
6 The official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) for 2002 was R$2.921 for US$1 (WDI).  
7 Movements between the work categories may also reflect labor market conditions and would as such also 
be a potentially interesting research topic.     11




Table 2.1: Education Levels in Brazil 
Primary school  1−4 years 
Lower secondary  5−8 years 
Low skilled 
Upper secondary  9−11 years 
Higher education  12+ years 
High skilled 
Source: Blom et al. (2001) 
 
 
3. Long-Run Perspective and Trends in the Labor Market  
 
This section considers trends in the Brazilian labor market for the period 
1978−2002 by examining four labor market indicators (LFPR, ER [+ER
C], UR, and 
HRW), while the business cycle responses are discussed in Section 4. 
  
3.1 Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) 
 
The LFPR for youth (15−24 years) was almost the same in 2002 as in 1978, but 
with a peak in between (Figure 3.1). The LFPR for youth was close to 60 percent both in 
the beginning and end of the period, but the trend was downward since peaking at 64.9 
percent in 1992. A reason for this trend may be a discouragement effect because of the 
high level of youth unemployment (Section 3.3), but also because of increased school 
attendance in the 1990s. In contrast, adult workers (25−49 years) experienced an almost 
continuously increasing LFPR; up by 18 percent from 66 to 78 percent.  
 











































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
* Extrapolated years or significant changes in PNAD (all figures).   
                                                 
8 While presenting no problem for defining the skill level, the years of schooling variable used for the 
definition is a censored variable with the value 15 for 15 years of education or above. Thus, average years 
of schooling, is downward biased.   12
  Females experienced a significant increase in the LFPR (Figure 3.2). Coming 
from a low point, young and adult females increased their LFPR. While young females 
increased their participation by 21 percent, adult females increased theirs by 65 percent. 
Thus, although young females had a higher participation rate than adult females before 
1982, a steeper increase for adult females opened a gap between the age groups. The gap 
increased to adult females having a 14 percentage points higher LFPR for than female 
youth by 2002.  
 
The male LFPR declined for youth and remained constant for adults, thus 
narrowing the gap with females. While continuously above 92 percent, the adult male 
LFPR remained almost constant. For young males the LFPR peaked at 83 percent in 
1987, but declined since to 71 percent, i.e., a 13 percent decrease. In spite of the decline 
in male participation and impressive increase in female participation, there is still a gap 
between the female and male LFPR, but the gap has narrowed significantly. Figure 3.1 
also shows that the drop in adult male participation was more than offset by the increase 
in female participation; this has not been the case for youth.  
 


















































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
The increase in labor force participation for females is also linked to educational 
attainment, because the opportunity cost of not working increases with education.
9 
Females have increased their average years of schooling significantly more than males 
(Figure 3.3) and by 2002 both young and adult females had more years of schooling than 
males on average. Thus, the significantly higher female school enrolment rate caused the 
change from adult females being less educated than males to the reverse situation (Figure 
3.4). This gender gap will increase over the years to come.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Education is naturally also linked to location, because secondary and tertiary education facilities are 
located in urban areas.   13
Figure 3.3: Average Years of Schooling in Brazil 
(1978−2002) 
Figure 3.4: School Enrolment Rates for Youth in 



































































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
Youth have a higher LFPR in rural areas than in urban areas, but urban youth 
have been catching up because females entered the labor market (Appendix B). Rural 
youth had a higher LFPR than urban youth, because male participation was 13 percentage 
points higher in rural areas. Rural and urban female youth was at the same level in 1978, 
but a gap opened with urban females moving into the labor market and rural females 
leaving it. In 2002 the gap stood at 10.9 percentage points. The change may be explained 
by urban areas being more open for changes in the gender roles and rural areas being 
conservative, keeping at least young females locked in traditional pattern with household 
chores etc.
10 The change in gender patterns have nearly closed the gap between the 
overall rural and urban youth participation rates. 
 
High skilled workers had a higher LFPR than low skilled in 2002. In 1978, low 
skilled youth had a higher LFPR than high skilled, but after 1981, the high skilled had the 
highest rate. This change occurred because the LFPR of low skilled youth dropped 8.0 
percent, while the high skilled increased theirs by 22.9 percent. In contrast, both high and 
low skilled adults experienced an increase, but while the low skilled increased their 
participation by 15.4 percent the participation of high skilled increased just 6.8 percent.   
 
These results are primarily driven by the change in the female LFPR. Figures 3.5 
and 3.6 reveal that high skilled adult females increased their participation by 21.1 
percent, and their young peers increased theirs by 29.1 percent. Low skilled adult females 
increased their participation rate by 59.5 percent, while their young peers decreased theirs 
by just 0.7 percent. In contrast, the LFPR fell for all male skill levels and age groups, 
besides high skilled youth who increased their participation by 17.5 percent. Also, until 
                                                 
10 This hypothesis is supported for adults where urban females drove the trend with an increase in the 
participation rate from 39.5 to 65.7 percent between 1978 and 2002 (up by 66 percent). However for adults, 
rural females also started a change of pattern and entered the labor market; their participation rate went up 
from 36.9 to 53.5 percent (up by 45 percent).  
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around 1990 there was a general increase in participation for all youth, but afterwards 
only high skilled females increased their participation rate while participation fell for all 
other youth.  
 
Figure 3.5: Labor Force Participation Rate for Females 
in Brazil by Skill Level (1978−2002) 
Figure 3.6: Labor Force Participation Rate for Males in 














































15-24 low skilled females
25-49 low skilled females
15-24 high skilled females
25-49 high skilled females














































15-24 low skilled males
25-49 low skilled males
15-24 high skilled males
25-49 high skilled males
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
To summarize, the labor force composition has changed significantly. The LFPR 
of young workers is below that of adults, and the gap has widened. Male youth continue 
to have a higher participation rate than females, but the gap is closing, because especially 
urban females entered the labor market, while rural males left it in the 1990s. This may 
be explained by females expanding the educational gap with males, and by a change in 
the traditional gender patterns. By 2004, the high skilled had higher participation rates 
than the low skilled. Furthermore, adults had higher participation rates than youth, and 
especially urban—but also rural females and low skilled—had entered the labor market.  
 
3.2 Employment Rate (ER) and Corrected Employment Rate (ER
C) 
 
  The ER for Brazilian youth decreased in absolute terms and relative to adults 
between 1978 and 2002 (Figure 3.7). The ER for youth is down by 14 percent from 57 to 
49 percent in 1978 and 2002, respectively. In contrast, adults experienced an increase in 
the ER by 11 percent over the period. Thus, the gap between youth and adults increased. 
Moreover, after the early 1990s a continuously smaller proportion of youth found jobs, 
while adults improved their likelihood of working. Considering the economic growth in 
most years after 1993, it is interesting that employment did not increase, i.e., there was 
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Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
The higher ER for adults, and in particular the drop in youth employment could 
be explained by an increasing share of youth being in school and thereby not available for 
the labor market. School enrollment rates confirm this to some extent (Figure 3.4), 
because they were almost constant or even slightly falling until 1992, but increasing 
afterwards. Thus, correcting for school enrollment, may give a clearer picture of the 
employment situation for youth. 
 
The drop in the employment rate is not fully explained by increased school 
enrollment, and an overall declining trend driven by male youth persists when 
considering the corrected employment rate, i.e., the trends are similar to that of the 
standard ER (Figure 3.8). Excluding those attending school increases the employment 
rate compared to the standard ER as expected, but the trend of a falling youth 
employment after the early 1990s remains. Given that the overall picture of employment 
trends does not change significantly by correcting for school enrollment, the analysis 
continues with main focus on the standard ER. 
 





























































Source: Own calculations on PNAD   16
While the ER fell for youth relative to adults, only adult women experienced an 
increase (Figure 3.9). Since the late 1980s both female and male youth experienced a 
falling ER. In contrast, adult females not only entered the labor market, a large share of 
the entrants also found employment. In 1978, young females were more likely to be 
employed than adults, but with the higher growth rate in the adult female ER, the profile 
shifted over the 1980s, and a wide gap opened between the age groups (27 percentage 
points in 2002 vs. 15 percentage points in 1986). Similarly, the drop in the young male 
ER increased the gap with adults (21 percentage points in 2002).  
 



















































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
Rural youth have been more employed than urban youth, but location is less 
important for adults (Appendix C). A gap of 7─13 percentage points in favor of rural 
youth employment existed over the period. The gap is almost entirely due to males, for 
whom urban youth have lower employment rates. This follows from their lower 
participation rate. In contrast, urban and rural female youth employment rates were 
almost identical over the years. Thus, the increase in urban female participation did 
disturbingly not lead to increased employment. For adults, rural males had slightly higher 
employment rates than urban males, but vice versa for females.  
 
High skilled workers generally performed better with respect to employment than 
low skilled workers; only adult females experienced a higher relative increase for the low 
skilled. Thus, there is a distinction between the growth/deterioration rates for different 
skill levels. The pattern of adult females tending over time to find employment, and 
young females and all males to exit or at least not enter employment, is fairly consistent 
irrespective of skill level (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). However, while low skilled female 
youth had a higher ER than the high skilled in the early 1980s, the relationship reversed 
around 1982. This gap increased afterwards because employment declined the most 
among low skilled youth.  
   17
Figure 3.10: Employment Rate for Females in Brazil by 
Skill Level (1978−2002) 
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15-24 high skilled males
25-49 high skilled males
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
  In summary, employment has fallen significantly for youth both in absolute terms 
and relative to adults. In fact, even the economic growth in the mid 1990s was jobless. 
While both female and male youth lost employment after the late 1980s, adult females 
not only entered the labor market, they also found employment. In contrast, male youth 
lost ground and the gap with adults widened. A larger proportion of rural than urban male 
youth were employed. However, location was less important for female youth, and the 
increased labor force participation rate among female urban youth did not lead to 
employment. For adults, rural males had higher employment than urban males, but vice 
versa for females. Employment fell the most among low skilled youth compared to the 
high skilled. The opposite was observed for adults, because low skilled females increased 
employment significantly following the surge in participation in the labor market.   
 
3.3 Unemployment Rate (UR) 
 
Between 1978 and 2002, the UR increased 4.3 and 5.3 times for youth and adults, 
respectively, mainly due to a surge in the 1990s (Figure 3.12). The unemployment rate 
went up substantially for youth and adults. The increase was even more dramatic than the 
numbers for the entire period suggest, because the increase mainly occurred in the 1990s, 
where both the youth and adult UR more than tripled. Until around 1996, the labor 
market created almost a sufficient number of jobs for the growing labor force, but job 
creation was insufficient afterward. The jobless growth in the 1990s led to a severe 
increase in youth unemployment; peaking at 19.4 percent in 1999. Given the high level of 
youth unemployment, there is likely also to be a discouragement effect keeping youth out 
of the labor market, and thus leading to the UR underestimating the severity of the 
situation.  
 
A change in definition of unemployment in 1992 explains part of the jump in 
unemployment between 1990 and 1992. Prior to 1992, a person was classified as being in   18
the labor force if working at least 15 hours during the reference week, and not considered 
part of the labor force if working less than 15 hours a week. From 1992 onward, workers 
only needed to work one hour during the reference week to be considered in the labor 
force. In consequence, all individuals, who worked few hours but also searched for jobs, 
were classified as unemployed, and thus the redefinition would lead to an increase in the 
unemployment rate.
11 Also workers for own consumption were included as workers from 
1992 onward.
12 Thus, with more youth than adults working less than 15 hours a week, the 
group was more affected by the change in definition. However, even though the change 
in definition may explain part of the increase in unemployment, Cuadros (2003) finds that 
just 1.4 percentage points of the jump in the overall UR is explained by it. Also, 
considering the increase in labor force participation combined with the decline in 
employment, it is clear that a real increase in unemployment occurred.   
 
The unemployment ratio between youth and adults remained stable despite 
increasing unemployment. The ratio of the youth to adult UR remained fairly constant at 
2.4−3.2 in spite of wide economic fluctuations. Even though adults experienced a 
relatively bigger increase in the UR, the increase in the UR for youth was more notable, 
because of the much higher initial level of unemployment.  
 





























Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
  In 1992 a gap opened between the female and male UR for both youth and adults, 
with a higher unemployment rate among females (Figure 3.13). Between 1978 and 1990, 
the UR for females and males were almost identical within each of the two age groups. 
However, just two years later female youth unemployment was 5.8 percentage points 
higher than for males, and for female adults it was 2.3 percentage points higher than for 
                                                 
11 I am grateful to Phillippe Leite for this observation. 
12 Workers for own consumption are all workers working for themselves and not receiving a wage. These 
were not defined as labor force participants before 1992.   19
males. By 1998 the gap had increased to 9.3 and 4.6 percentage points for youth and 
adults, respectively. Part of this change is explained by the change in definition of 
unemployment in 1992, which did not affect females and males equally. Since a larger 
proportion of women work few hours per week, more women were reclassified as 
unemployed after the redefinition. 
 


















































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
The level of urban youth unemployment has reached a disturbing level. The gap 
between urban and rural youth unemployment increased from 5 percentage points in 1978 
to 15 percentage points in 2002 (Figure 3.14). This, combined with the higher initial level 
for urban youth, meant that they were adversely affected even though the relative 
increase in unemployment was lowest for that particular age group. The recession in the 
early 1990s created a break with urban youth unemployment more than doubling (from 
6.9 to 15.4 percent) in just three years (1990─1992).
13 However as noted, also rural 
unemployment increased significantly and, in fact, it six-doubled, but still ended up at 
just 6.8 percent. Thus, the increased participation rate in urban areas, especially for 
females, combined with a lower employment rate led to a higher unemployment rate in 
urban areas. For adults, urban unemployment was also higher than rural unemployment, 








                                                 
13 Again, part of the increase is explained by the change in definition of unemployment in 1992. As for 
women, urban youth may have been affected different from rural workers according to how many hours 
they worked.    20































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
High skilled workers had generally a lower UR than the low skilled at the end of 
the period, but this only came to be true for women in the early 1990s (Figures 3.15 and 
3.16, next page). The UR does not differ much between skill groups, but generally the 
UR was slightly higher for the low skilled in the 1990s. Actually, high skilled females 
had a higher UR than low skilled in the 1980s, but since the beginning of the 1990s low 
skilled females had the highest unemployment rate.
14 Only high skilled male youth 
experienced a higher UR than their low skilled peers throughout the 1990s. This latter 




In summary, unemployment skyrocketed for youth, especially in the 1990s, and 
reached 19.4 percent in 1999. In relation to adults, youth unemployment was close to 
three times higher since adults reached 7.9 percent in 1999. As a result of the surge in 
female labor force participation and lack of jobs (as well as a redefinition of 
unemployment), female unemployment jumped in the early 1990s and the group 
continued to suffer from a higher unemployment rate than males for the remainder of the 
period. The upward trend in youth unemployment was mainly led by urban areas, 
however, also rural areas experienced an increase, but from a much lower level. In 
relation to skills, education shielded to some degree against unemployment.  
 
                                                 
14 The continuous increase in the UR for low skilled is likely to be biased by heterogeneity and self-
selection. This is the case, since the high skilled group grows in relative size with the increasing education 
attainment over time. With more people staying longer in school, a self-selection process of continuously 
worse mean workers leaving school early takes place.  
15 Duration of unemployment may be linked to financial freedom because youth from rich households are 
more likely to be high skilled and they can afford longer search time. Likewise, if the initial job match for 
new labor market entrants is considered important for career and income prospects, the richer and high 
skilled youth may decide to search longer for jobs to make the most of it. Self-selection relates to the low 
skilled as some would leave school early because of a job opportunity. However, these arguments assume 
male youth are treated and behave different from female youth in the household and labor market since 
similar results are not found for female youth.    21
 
Figure 3.15: Unemployment Rate for Females in Brazil 
by Skill Level (1978−2002) 
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Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
 
3.4 Work Category and the Hourly Real Wage (HRW)  
 
  The majority of Brazilian workers are wage workers. The group of interest in 
respect to remuneration for work, rather than for returns to capital, is the group of wage 
workers. Considering the labor market in a broad sense by including unpaid and domestic 
workers Tables 3.1−3.3 allow at least four interesting observations in the Brazilian labor 
market: First, table 3.1 shows that the majority of Brazilian workers are wage workers, 
confirming the importance of the group for whom wages are investigated. Second, nearly 
one in four is self-employed, while less than one in twenty are employers. Third, a 
significant proportion work unpaid or as domestic workers (14 percent); two potentially 
vulnerable groups. Finally, little changed between 1978 and 2002 for the labor market as 
a whole. 
  
Table 3.1: Work Category, Brazil 1978−2002 (15-65 years) 
 1978  1989  2002 
Wage workers  58.3  61.4  58.0 
Self-employed 24.2  22.3  23.3 
Employer 3.4  4.5  4.5 
Unpaid worker  8.5  6.2  5.8 
Domestic worker  5.7  5.7  8.4 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
  A relatively large proportion of youth are wage workers, unpaid workers, and 
domestic workers, and a larger share of adults are self-employed or employers (Table 
3.2). While young workers are more likely to be wage workers, unpaid, or domestic   22
workers than adults, they are less likely to be self-employed or employers.
16 Compared to 
2002, a larger proportion of youth were unpaid workers (15.6 percent), and a smaller 
proportion of youth were wage workers (64.5 percent) in 1978.  
 
Table 3.2: Work Category by Age, Brazil 2002  




Wage workers  68.2  58.6 
Self-employed 10.5  24.0 
Employer 0.8  5.2 
Unpaid worker  11.7  3.7 
Domestic worker  8.9  8.5 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
  Young males are wage workers, self-employed and unpaid workers, while 
females also work unpaid and as domestic workers (Table 3.3). Young males are on a 
direct track to become breadwinners since they help out in the household enterprise, work 
in a paid job, or start their own business. In contrast, young females are more likely to 
help out in the household, do chores, and take care of the children. The distribution for 
young males was the same in 2002 as in 1978, but females changed to more being wage 
workers, and less working unpaid or as domestic workers. These observations match the 
changes in the discussed labor market indicators and suggest an improvement for females 
as gender inequality and dependency are reduced.  
 
 Table 3.3: Work Category for Brazilian Youth, 2002 
 Male  Female 
Wage workers  73.3  60.1 
Self-employed 12.1  8.1 
Employer 0.9  0.5 
Unpaid worker  12.9  9.6 
Domestic worker  0.9  21.6 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
  
Thus, the majority of employed youth and adults are wage workers, and for this 
group hourly real wages will be investigated to see how returns to labor have changed 
over time and across age, gender, location, and skills.  
 
  The HRW decreased between 1978 and 2002; only a deceiving peak in 1986 
breaks the trend (Figure 3.17). The average wage decreased for both young and adult 
workers. Looking at the wage evolution, the peak in 1986 catches the eye, but wages for 
this particular year are deceiving (Ferreira et al. 2006). What affected wages dramatically 
                                                 
16 The observation of young workers being less self-employed than adults is expected since a life cycle in 
the labor market, in the broad context defined here, could include work initiation by doing household 
chores or helping out in the family business, then move into paid employment and later, if sufficient 
savings, skills, and connections have accumulated, start a business and become self-employed or even 
expand to become an employer.    23
in 1986 was the expansionary cruzado stabilization plan.
17 During September 1986, when 
the PNAD survey was conducted, prices were frozen according to the plan and rationing 
and black markets existed. Thus, real wages increased because frozen prices and 
rationing created a mismatch between monetary income and welfare, since goods were 
not always sufficient to satisfy demand. The Cruzado plan was abandoned the same year 
and inflation surged in 1987 to restore equilibrium prices. The effect on observed real 
wages was also a return to a level close to the one in 1985. In general real wages are 
considered to have increased in 1986 (ibid.), but not by the approximately 45 percent 
observed for youth and adults in Figure 3.17.  
 
Wages fell for both age groups and young workers had lower wages than adults. 
The observed drop in wages from the peak in 1989 to 2002 was by 4.0 and 13.9 percent 
for youth and adults, respectively. In addition, there is a wage gap between youth and 
adults. Adults received 1.9−2.2 times what youth received. Thus, in spite of fluctuation 
and the larger relative drop in adult HRW after the mid 1980s, the ratio between youth 
and adult wages remained almost fixed. Finally, the jump in wages between 1993 and 
1995 coincides with the minimum wage being changed to an annual adjustment rather 
than a monthly as a result of the falling inflation. The increasing minimum real wage may 
have reduced flexibility.  
 






































Source: Own calculations on PNAD  
 
  Females changed to have a higher average HRW than males, but not when 
accounting for other characteristics (Figure 3.18). In 1978, female youth received 1.1 
percent more than males, while female adults received 12.0 percent less than males. By 
2002, the gap for youth had increased to 14.3 percent and reversed for adults. Important 
reasons for this change are the higher education of females, self-selection out of the labor 
                                                 
17 Thus, the results reported are correct and do not reflect changes or errors in the PNAD in any way.   24
force of females with low earnings potential vis-à-vis their husband and from wage work 
into self-employment for males with the highest earnings potential.
18   
 



















































Source: Own calculations on PNAD  
 
Urban wages are substantially higher than rural wages, but they also dropped the 
most. Urban wages for youth fell over time both in real terms and relative to rural youth 
(Appendix E). From urban wages for youth being 95 percent higher than rural wages in 
1978, they fell to a level 66 percent higher in 2002. Also wages for urban adults went 
down compared to rural adults’. The decline in urban wages results partially from wage 
pressure from the high and increasing urban unemployment. However, since male wages 
fell more than females’ in both rural and urban areas, and female wages increased in rural 
areas, there is more to it than that; at least it is notable that in spite of the surge in female 
unemployment, their wages were still catching up on males’.      
 
High skilled workers earn more per hour than low skilled, but the skill premium is 
decreasing (Figures 3.19 and 3.20). For both females and males the HRW is higher for 
high skilled workers than for low skilled irrespective of age. However, the skill premium 
(high vs. low) decreased over the 1990s. For male youth the skill premium decreased 
                                                 
18 There are at least three reasons for females to receive the highest HRW on average: First, a larger 
proportion of young females than males are high skilled. Young females’ skills over time determine the 
skills of adult females (Appendix D). In this way the proportion of high skilled has been increasing faster 
for women than for men. Second, Table 3.3 suggested that self-selection of the most capable males into 
self-employment and wage work may be an issue. This would imply that the mean employed male wage 
worker is less attractive to the labor market than the mean female worker, ceteris paribus. Further support 
to this argument is the fact that self-employed males and male employers have a higher HRW than females 
in the same work categories, but this includes returns to capital also. Third, females with lower earnings 
potential may self-select out of the labor force because of a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis  their 
husband.    25
from 145 to 82 percent in 1988 and 2002, respectively, while the skill premium for 
female youth declined from 110 to 79 percent over the same years. Adults had higher 
returns to skills, but experienced a similar decline. Thus, the decline in skill premium in 
the 1990s was steeper for males than females, and the skill premium was almost equal 
across genders in 2002. The higher skill premium for adults is partly explained by a wider 
education gap between high and low skilled for adults than for youth.
19 The decline in 
skill premium may be the result of the increasing supply of skilled workers.
20 
 
For each skill level males received a higher HRW than females, but work sector 
and other characteristics explain the difference. While early studies showed signs of 
discrimination, Birdsall and Fox (1985) explain the gender wage differential by other 
factors; at least for the case of schoolteachers back in 1970. Arabsheibani et al. (2003) 
point to work sector as the determining factor since workers in manufacturing and related 
male dominated activities earn more than workers in other sectors.  
 
Figure 3.19: Hourly Wage for Females in Brazil by Skill 
Level (1978−2002) 
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Source: Own calculations on PNAD  
 
In summary, wages have gone down over the 25 years covered. The increasing 
majority of youth are wage workers, but a substantial proportion of female youth work 
unpaid or as domestic workers. Hourly real wages declined for both youth and adults, but 
remained stable in ratio with youth receiving only half of what adults received. While 
females had higher wages than males on average this is explained by skills and self-
                                                 
19 On average, high skilled adults had 7.6 years of schooling more than low skilled adults in 2002, while the 
gap between high and low skilled youth was 5.4 years.  
20 A former study has shown decreasing returns to secondary education possibly reflecting excess supply 
and low demand because of declining quality of education (Blom et al. 2001). Moreover, the study found 
that returns to tertiary education increased over time, because of increasing demand of highly skilled 
workers. For comparison with the results found here one needs to keep in mind that high skilled are here 
defined as all who have at least initiated higher secondary school. Therefore it includes not only workers 
who are part of the tertiary educated elite, but also workers who have only acquired relatively basic work 
skills.    26
selection. Accounting for skill levels alone, males have higher wages than females, but 
males also experienced a steeper decline, leading wages for the two groups to converge in 
spite of the massive surge in female unemployment. In terms of location, urban wages are 
higher than rural wages, but rural wages are catching up. For youth, wages in urban areas 
dropped significantly in response to the high and increasing urban unemployment rate. 
High skilled workers earned higher wages than low skilled, but the skill premium   
decreased and more so for males than females, leaving the returns to skills almost equal 
across genders in 2002; possibly as a result of the expanded supply of high skilled 
(especially secondary educated) workers.    
 
With these long-run trends in mind, the following section addresses the changes 
in the labor market indicators within business cycles.  
 
 
4. Business Cycle Perspective of the Labor Market  
 
Brazil has been through an economically turbulent period between 1978 and 2002 
(Figure 1.2). In sharp contrast to the previous decades, the country plunged into 
alternating short-term cycles of recessions and expansions with spiraling inflation in the 
1980s. The real annual changes in the main labor market indicators are presented in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for each of the five business cycles in the 1980s and 1990s 
investigated (Appendix A).
21    
 
4.1 Economic Recessions  
 
  Youth are adversely affected in terms of participation and employment during 
recessions. The LFPR increased more for adults than for youth during all three 
recessions, a result mainly driven by the increase in adult female participation (Figure 
3.5). Still, labor force participation went up for youth during the first two recessions, 
confirming earlier findings of youth being pushed into the labor market during 
recessions. Moreover, youth have been less positively or more negatively impacted with 
respect to both employment and corrected employment compared to adults during the 
three recessions (Table 4.1). While the smaller increase in the LFPR for youth could 
indicate that recessions deter youth from entering the labor market and therefore increase 
the incentive to stay in school, the ER versus the ER
C shows that the opposite is the case 
for the first two recessions; youth tend to leave school during recessions. However, 
between 1996 and 1999 the change in school enrollment followed the general upward 
trend. 
 
The three economic recessions in the 1980s and 1990s severely affected the 
unemployment rate for both youth and adults.
22 Adults experienced a relatively bigger 
                                                 
21 Results are not de-trended, because the full change during business cycles is of interest. However, the 
general findings are not sensitive to de-trending.    
22 The annual change in the UR for the recession in 1990−1992 is infected by the dramatic level change 
following the redefinition in PNAD. For the purpose of comparison across age groups the bias can be 
removed by considering the difference between annual changes for youth to those of adults. Of course, it is   27
increase in the UR than youth did in all three recessions. However, it is important to keep 
in mind the much higher level of unemployment for youth. Thus, with similar relative 
increases in the UR for youth and adults in the two recessions in the 1990s, a larger 
proportion of youth in the labor force moved into unemployment.  
 
Table 4.1: Annual Change in Brazilian Indicators During Recessions (percent) 
   1981−1983 1990−1992 1996−1999 
   Youth Adults Youth  Adults  Youth  Adults 
Labor force participation rate  0.97  1.52  0.76  1.26  -0.64  0.38 
Employment rate  0.79  1.42  -1.87  0.17  -2.73  -0.43 
Corrected employment rate  -0.21  0.98  -2.02  0.17  -1.58  -0.35 
Unemployment  rate  9.48 17.05  31.67 32.93 12.24 12.67 
Hourly real wage   -7.95  -6.01  -4.97  -6.82  -0.30  -0.79 
Years covered  3  3  4 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
Wages responded markedly to recessions, but less so in the late 1990s. Wages 
decreased significantly when unemployment increased during the first recession, but 
following the response in wages declined. The HRW fell 8 percent per year for youth in 
the first recession, nearly 2 percentage points more than the fall in adults’ HRW. 
However, in the recessions in the 1990s youth lost relatively less ground in respect to 
wages. The relative increase in wages for youth may have increased rigidity and caused a 




Young females increased both labor force participation and unemployment rates 
during recessions. Female youth increased their employment rate more or experienced a 
smaller decrease than male youth during recessions, but increased female participation in 
the labor market simultaneously led to more unemployment for the group. Also, adult 
females increased their labor force participation and employment rates, while adult males 
experienced a larger reduction in wages.  
 
  The pattern for high and low skilled workers changed with the recessions. While 
the first recession left an unclear picture of the value of skills, high skilled workers 
experienced a larger fall in the HRW than low skilled in the recession in the early 1990s, 
and in the late 1990s high skilled fared generally worse than low skilled. While both high 
and low skilled youth did not suffer as much as adults with the same skill level in the first 
recession (ignoring wages for the moment), the 1990s’ recessions offered less comfort for 
youth, because they generally performed worse in the labor market than adults did 
irrespective of skill level.  
 
In summary, youth have been worse affected during recessions than adults in 
terms of labor force participation, employment, and unemployment, but better in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                 
still likely the change in definition did not affect youth and adults equally, but it is more reliable than the 
real annual changes alone. 
23 Wage Rigidity and its Implications for Brazilian Youth (Fares and Justesen, forthcoming).    28
wages which may have increased rigidity. It appears that youth had less incentive to enter 
the labor market and a harder time finding employment or they were more likely to leave 
employment than adults during recessions. Although unemployment increased relatively 
more for adults, the high level of youth unemployment meant that a larger proportion of 
youth in the labor market was affected. The relative wage increase for youth may explain 
part of the unemployment jump, because while wages reduced the most for youth in the 
first recession, this was reversed in the 1990s and labor demand may consequently have 
dropped and caused a loss in job creation for young workers.  
 
4.2 Economic Expansions  
 
  Given that the results show that youth suffer more than adults during recessions, it 
would be reasonable to anticipate that youth also tend to catch up during periods of 
economic expansion. However, results indicate that this is not the case. In fact, youth are 
also largely adverse affected during periods of expansion. 
 
While results across business cycles are not identical, there is little evidence for 
youth to be catching up on adults during expansions. Findings show that the LFPR as 
well as the ER and ER
C increased slightly more for youth than for adults in the first 
growth period, but significantly less than adults in the last period (Table 4.2). During 
both periods unemployment declined, but relatively less so for youth.  
 
Table 4.2: Annual Change in Brazilian Indicators During Expansions 
(percent) 
   1984−1987 1994−1995 
   Youth Adults Youth  Adults 
Labor force participation rate  1.04  0.95  -0.92  0.84 
Employment rate  1.56  1.23  -0.85  0.90 
Corrected employment rate  1.05  1.24  0.59  0.95 
Unemployment rate  -6.01  -8.56  -0.53  -1.05 
Hourly real wage  5.22  4.70  10.63  8.52 
Years covered  4  2 
Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
Wages were also pro-cyclical during periods of expansion for both youth and 
adults, and youth saw the largest increase. However, the significant increase in wages in 
the last expansion did not continue the following years even though GDP per capita 
growth remained positive until 1997. This is likely to be the case because of the elevated 
level of unemployment putting wages under pressure.  
 
Young males did generally better than females during the 1980s’ economic 
expansion, but the opposite was the case in the mid 1990s. In the first expansion, male 
youth did better than females measured by most indicators. However, in the mid 1990s 
young males suffered a bigger drop in the ER, ER
C and LFPR, while young females 
experienced a bigger drop in the UR and a higher increase in the HRW. In general for the 
two periods, females increased both participation and employment to a larger extent than   29
males; especially adult females increased their ER. However, the increase in employment 
was not sufficient for females to reduce or curb the increase in the unemployment rate.  
 
A high skill level had a positive impact on youth, and especially on young males. 
Higher skills seem to increase the incentive for youth to enter the labor market, increase 
the probability of finding employment and shield from unemployment during expansions. 
In addition, high skilled male youth performed better than their adult peers, but low 
skilled female adults did better than their young peers. High skilled adult males also did 
better than their low skilled peers, while the opposite was the case for females.  
  
Summarizing the findings, youth have in general not been catching up on adults in 
the labor market during expansions. The LFPR, as well as the ER and ER
C, increased 
slightly more for youth than for adults in the first expansion, but significantly less in the 
last expansion. While unemployment was reduced less for youth than for adults, the wage 
increased the most for youth, and this may have reduced demand for this least 
experienced group, impacting the other indicators negatively. Thus, it appears that while 
wages of youth were catching up on adults’ wages, it reduced the attractiveness of hiring 
youth. In conclusion, few indicators support that youth are catching up on adults during 
expansions. The support, in fact, leans more to the opposite, viz., youth benefit less from 
expansions than adults.  
 
In conclusion for Section 4, Brazilian youth were harder hit by economic 
downturns than adults, but also they did not reap the benefits during positive fluctuations. 
During recessions youth lost ground in terms of labor force participation and 
employment, but in regard to wages and to some degree unemployment, they were better 
off than adults. However, the loss of employment may be directly linked to increased 
wages. During expansions, youth did not catch up on adults. In fact, youth generally lost 
ground in terms of all indicators apart from wages. Thus, relative wages moved opposite 
the other labor market indicators over most business cycles, and likely reduced demand 
for the less experienced workers.  
 
  
5. Conclusion  
 
The trend for youth compared to adults has been deterioration in most labor 
market measures between 1978 and 2002. The labor force participation rate is higher for 
adults than for youth, and the gap has increased. Likewise, the employment rate and the 
corrected employment rate have deteriorated in absolute and relative terms for youth 
compared to adults. While adults increased their employment rate, youth experienced a 
drop of 14 percent. The unemployment rate multiplied nearly four times for youth over 
the period covered; reaching 19.1 percent in 2002. Also, the adult unemployment rate 
increased substantially, but reached just 7.4 percent in 2002. In respect to hourly wages, 
adults received around two times what youth received, but in levels the gap decreased.  
 
Females experienced a very distinct labor market pattern, but different skill 
groups were harder to distinguish. While females are not at par with males, they have   30
been catching up in terms of participation, employment, and wages, but unfortunately 
they have also experienced increasing unemployment. In this way the traditional gender 
pattern is changing, but the high unemployment rate for females testifies that there is still 
a way to go to achieve equality in the labor market. While urban areas are taking the lead 
in this change, rural areas are not left unaffected. The situation for different skill groups 
is not as distinct as might be expected. However, the situation and trend for high skilled 
workers tend to be better than for low skilled in most terms, yet wages have been falling 
more for the former group.  
 
A break in the labor market occurred between the two decades in focus with the 
1980s offering less dramatic changes. Labor market trends for the 1980s were fairly 
positive for both youth and adults in terms of participation and employment. However, 
the unemployment rate increased slowly with a significant gap between young and adult. 
Real wages were fairly stable over the decade, but adult females received lower wages 
than males. Yet, females were catching up on males, since wages for particularly urban 
males decreased.  
 
The 1990s offered less conciliation for youth. Especially adult females drove up 
the LFPR, but for youth it fell because of a drop in the participation rate among low 
skilled males. Likewise, employment continued to rise for female adults, but dropped for 
all youth irrespective of skill level. The jobless growth in the 1990s was particularly hard 
on youth. Unemployment tripled with especially urban areas suffering, and the 
unemployment gap between youth and adults, and between females and males, increased. 
Wages decreased in general, but the age wage gap also decreased and the gender wage 
gap even reversed; now favoring females. While trends were generally bad for youth over 
the two decades, the labor market situation for youth deteriorated more rapidly in the 
1990s than in the 1980s, and because youth did not catch up during expansions in spite of 
suffering more than adults during recessions.     
 
Business cycle changes showed that Brazilian youth worked as a buffer absorbing 
negative business cycle fluctuations, but also they did not reap the benefits during 
positive economic fluctuations. In particular toward the end of the period, youth lost 
ground compared to adults in terms of labor force participation and employment during 
recessions, but in respect to changes in wages youth were better off. However, while the 
increase in relative wages benefited working youth, it may also have had a negative 
impact on employment. During expansions, youth did not catch up on adults. In fact, 
youth generally lost ground in terms of all indicators apart from wages. Thus, wages 
moved opposite the other labor market indicators during most business cycles.  
 
Future research needs to address how lasting adverse impacts on youth are. For 
example, Raaum and Røed (2002) find that labor market conditions at the time and place 
of potential entry into the labor market, have substantial and persistent impact on labor 
market performance using micro data for Norway. Birth cohorts that face depressed labor 
markets when graduating from primary or secondary education are subject to relatively 
high unemployment rates during their entire career. Also, Oreopoulos et al. (2006), 
confirm a long-run negative impact on wages for young graduates entering the Canadian   31
labor market in a recession. Thus, if Brazilian youth experience the same long-lasting 
effects from unemployment, the current level of youth unemployment will affect the 
entire population negatively for many years to come. 
 
  Finally, wage rigidity has been hinted at a number of times in this paper, as a 
potential explanation for the deterioration in the labor market for youth in the latter part 
of the period covered. This hypothesis is explored in a forthcoming paper.    
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Appendix A 
 
The five business cycles analyzed here are identified by Neri and Thomas 
(2002b).  
 
The three periods of economic recession are: 
•  The Latin American Debt Crisis (1981−1983) 
The first debt crisis combined with impacts from the second world wide oil 
shock was one of the most severe economic contractions since 1929 with 
negative GDP growth for the period. The external shock combined with tight 
monetary policy and trade restrictions, introduced to curb inflation and cut the 
trade deficit, led to a deep recession. Imports fell, but inflation persisted. 
Employment in manufacturing and construction fell, while the informal labor 
market expanded (Zylberstajn and de Souza 1994). 
 
•  The Collor Plan (1990−1992) 
The Collor plan combined structural reforms with stabilization policies. Prices 
were frozen, the exchange rate fixed, and trade was liberalized. With the 
government’s move to halt inflation by monetary contraction the economy 
moved into recession and poverty increased markedly. 
 
•  The Asian Crisis and The Real Devaluation (1996−1999) 
The Asian financial crisis put new pressure on the real. This pressure grew with 
the Russian default, and the crawling peg was finally abandoned in January 
1999. The real weakened in the last half of 1999, because the trade deficit 
remained.  
 
The two periods of economic expansion are: 
•  The Recovery After the Debt Crisis and The Cruzado Plan Boom (1984−1987) 
Public spending was cut, and the currency devalued in 1983. The recovery was 
export led, and unemployment and poverty fell. By 1985 price controls 
substituted strict fiscal and monetary policies, but these did not last and inflation 
returned. In spite of recovery, the informal market continued to grow rapidly. 
Inflation decreased with the introduction of the cruzado in March 1986. 
Stabilization after the recession was achieved by expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy combined with an unsustainable consumption led growth. 
Trade deficits eventually forced the fixed exchange rate to be abandoned, and 
repeated periods of hyperinflations occurred. 
 
•  The Real Boom (1994−1995)  
The 1994 plan introduced the new currency with a more credible crawling 
dollar peg. A period of capital inflow and consumption led expansion followed 
during which imports increased. With the tequila crisis capital flows wavered, 
and the trade deficit increased. The monetary policy was kept tight, and the 
dollar peg maintained. Toward the end of the period the minimum real wage 




Figure B.1: Rural/Urban Female Labor Force Participation Rate in Brazil 
(1978−2002) 



























































































































































Source: Own calculations on PNAD 
 
 




Figure D.1: Distribution of Female Wage Workers by Skill Level,  
Brazil 1978─2002 
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Figure E.1: Rural/Urban Female Hourly Real Wage in Brazil 
(1978−2002) 
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